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were to be attacked in his own home),-even to the point of killing
the aggressor, is to put the imprimatur of civility upon an uncivilized
act. If the law will justify the taking of life in the recited circumstances,
what legal or moral restraint can logically distinguish aggression in any
other situation where the choice lies between escape or homicide?
Has the Pennsylvania court re-established the law of the frontier and
the days of the old west?
It is not a facile matter to distinguish the "retreat" and "no retreat"
areas, and a herculean task to define them. Logic would appear to
justify the conclusion that for all practical purposes, the future23 use
of self-defense will not require the accused to flee aggression in Penn-
sylvania homicide cases. To borrow an old phrase: "The exception has
now become the rule."
J. Kerry Lewis
CRIMINAL LAW-THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY-BURDEN OF PROVING
SANITY OR INSANITY-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
insanity is a defense to murder, but was unable to come to any agree-
ment as to the effect of the presumption of sanity, and the burden of
proving sanity or insanity.
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
The defendant, Dennis Vogel, shot and killed two persons while carry-
ing out an armed robbery. At his trial, he pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity. The defense presented four eminent psychiatrists to estab-
lish Vogel's legal insanity in accordance with the M'Naghten rule. The
commonwealth offered no testimony to rebutt or impeach the testi-
23. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) set forth the following standard:
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily
harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat;
(1) The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless
he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person
whose place of work the actor knows it to be. ...
The Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania Which was submitted by the Joint State
Goverment to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1967, uses precisely the same lan-
guage in Section 304(b)(2)(ii)(a) Use of Force in Sell-Protection.
It will be noted that the subject case has extended the proposed area of retreat by
substituting "place of business" for "place of work", and by elimination of the specific
qualifying conditions dealing with retreat.
Query: Is the court more sensitive to the public's need than the peoples' elected rep-
resentatives?
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mony given by the witnesses for the defense. Instead, the commonwealth
relied soley upon the presumption of sanity, and upon the testimony
of witnesses as to the circumstances surrounding the robbery and kill-
ings. Vogel was subsequently found guilty of armed robbery, as well as
two counts of murder in the second degree. In a five-two decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed his conviction, and a new trial
was granted. Four separate opinions were filed by the members of the
court. Three opinions in support of the order for a new trial, and one
dissenting opinion.
BACKGROUND
It has been a well settled principle of law in this commonwealth that
insanity is an affirmative defense, with the burden of proof resting with
the defendant.' It has been an equally well settled principle that all
men are presumed to be sane, until the presumption has been rebutted
by a fair preponderance of the evidence; and the presumption is to be
treated as the full equivalent of express proof.2 The presumption is the
equivalent of proof in that the prosecution is not required to present
any evidence to reinforce the presumption. To this extent the prosecu-
tion can rely solely on the presumption. The jury is then permitted to
weigh the evidence of insanity presented by the defendant, against the
naked presumption in order to establish whether the defendant has
sustaind his burden of proof.
The instant case is of major importance in that it establishes a depar-
ture from the principle which treats the presumption as the equiva-
lent of full and express proof. The present case also elicits a significant
new trend, by a minority of the court, away from the treatment of in-
sanity as an affirmative defense.
THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY AND ITS EFFECT
The issue surrounding the presumption of sanity is best stated as
follows--can the defendant be convicted of murder, where he has in-
troduced evidence to challenge the presumption of sanity; and where
the commonwealth has relied solely on the presumption, and has pre-
1. Commonwealth v. Carlucetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A.2d 391 (1952).
2. Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289, 22 A. 464 (1891); Commonwealth v. lacobino,
319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935).
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sented no evidence to impeach or otherwise off-set the evidence of in-
sanity? Or, more simply, can the presumption be relied upon as the full
equivalent of proof?
Case law in Pennsylvania as early as Commonwealth v. Gerade,3 has
taken the position that the presumption of sanity is the equivalent of
full and express proof. The presumption is considered to be valid until
it is successfully rebutted by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This
principle has been reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Iacobino, the court
holding that: "where mental capacity at the time of the act is at issue,
the Commonwealth is aided by the presumption of sanity, it is not re-
quired to prove affirmatively mental capacity to commit the act." 4 Ac-
cordingly, when the defendant introduces evidence challenging the
presumption, it has traditionally been sufficient to give rise to a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Jones, with whom Mr. Justice O'Brien
concurs, addressed himself to the effect of the presumption of sanity.
Relying on the approach taken by the court in the civil case of Allison
v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc, he takes the position that "a verdict may
not be based solely upon a presumption where there is evidence which
credibly contradicts the presumption." Therefore, the prosecution can
not, as it did in the instant case, simply rest it's case upon the presump-
tion.
The result of this approach is to change the role accorded the pre-
sumption of sanity, from an evidentiary device to a procedural device.
As a procedural device, the presumption of sanity operates as a pre-
sumption of fact. To this extent, it serves only to remove the question
of sanity from the criminal proceeding until it is deliberately put in
issue by the defense. Once challenged, the presumption is no longer
valid, and is totally discarded in considering the sanity issue. This is an
obvious departure from the manner in which the presumption was used
in Gerade, and Iacobino.
This approach is not an unfounded one, since it has been established
firmly in the civil law of the commonwealth. In Watkins v. Prudential
Insurance Co. the court said:
A presumption itself contributes no evidence, and has no proba-
tive quality. It is sometimes said that the presumption will tip the
3. Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289, 22 A. 464 (1891).
4. Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 69, 178 A. 823, 826 (1935).
5. Allison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 899 (1967).
6. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 13, 268 A.2d 89, 95 (1970).
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scale when the evidence is balanced. But, in truth, nothing tips the
scale but evidence, and a presumption, being a legal rule or con-
clusion is not evidence.7
In Heath v. Klosterman, the court also said: "A presumption such as
this is not evidence, and it can not weigh as evidence, since it gives way
the moment proof of the contrary is presented." 8
It is recognized by Justice Jones, that there is no valid reason why a
presumption of fact, which is given no evidentiary weight in a civil case,
should be treated any differently in the realm of criminal law.
As was stated above, the effect of this approach is to remove the con-
cept of the presumption from the realm of evidence into the realm of
procedure. In so doing, the role of the presumption of sanity can best
be described as a procedural convenience which eliminates the issue
of sanity from the trial until it is put in issue by the defendant.
In separate opinions filed by Mr. Justice Roberts, and Mr. Justice
Pomeroy, the effect of the presumption of sanity was handled inciden-
tally to the problem of the burden of proof. They too agree in princi-
ple, that the presumption of sanity is to be given no evidentiary weight,
but rather is to be used as a procedural convenience.9 Here too, a de-
parture from the rule established in Gerade and Iacobino can be seen.
The approach taken in the opinions by Justices Jones, Pomeroy, and
Roberts shows little disagreement concerning the effect of the presump-
tion of sanity. But, they do disagree, as will be shown, over the issue of
proving sanity or insanity.
THE EFFECT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The positions taken by Justices Pomeroy and Roberts are in disagree-
ment with those of Justices Jones and O'Brien as to two very important
issues. First, who carries the burden of proving sanity or insanity? Sec-
ond, what quantum of evidence is required to establish sanity or
insanity?
A long line of cases, the most recent of which being Commonwealth
v. Updegrove,10 have firmly established the principle that insanity is an
affirmative defense; and therefore the burden of proving insanity rests
with the defendant. This same line of cases has also established that a
7. Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 503, 173 A. 644, 647 (1934).
8. Heath v. Klosterman, 343 Pa. 501, 504, 23 A.2d 209, 210 (1941).
9. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 18, 289 A.2d 91, 103 (1970).
10. Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534 (1964).
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fair preponderance of the evidence is the quantum necessary to sustain
this defense."
Addressing himself to the problem, Mr. Justice Roberts takes the
position that the burden of proving insanity is not a matter of defense. 12
His opinion is that once the presumption of sanity has been challenged,
the burden of proving sanity must necessarily rest with the prosecu-
tion. 13 A specific mens rea has always been considered as much an ele-
ment of the crime of murder as the act of killing.'4 Starting with this
premise, it is argued by Justice Roberts that intent to commit murder is
so interrelated with the capacity to formulate the intent, i.e. sanity, as
to become an essential element of the crime.' 5 Very simply, you can not
have the intent to commit murder if you do not have the capacity to
formulate the requisite intent. Therefore, sanity is an element of the
crime which must be proven by the prosecution. It is not a novel ap-
proach to require the prosecution to prove the existence of sanity as an
element of the crime. This rule is in effect in the federal courts as well
as twenty-two of the states.' 6
Mr. Justice Pomeroy, takes essentially the same stand on the question
of the burden of proof. Although he does not espouse the same argu-
ments of interrelation between intent and sanity which had been made
by Justice Roberts, it can only be assumed that he must agree in prin-
ciple with these arguments. He states in his opinion that:
I realize that our case law has placed upon the defendant the
burden of establishing his insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.., upon reflection, however, I see no reason why the Com-
monwealth should not have the same burden with regard to sanity,
once that matter has been put in issue, as we have placed upon it as
to all other facts necessary to support a guilty verdict.17
This leads directly into the problem of what quantum of evidence
should be required of the prosecution in order to prove the element of
sanity. In Commonwealth v. Bonomo,18 the court reiterated the long
standing rule of law that in a criminal case, the commonwealth has the
11. See note 1.
12. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 14, 268 A.2d 89, 91 (1970).
13. Id.
14. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
15. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 15, 268 A.2d 89, 91 (1970).
16. 17 A.L.R. 3rd 146, 158, 159 (1968).
17. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 19, 268 A.2d 89, 103 (1970).
18. Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959).
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burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element
necessary for a conviction. Recently, in the case of In Re Winship,9 the
United States Supreme Court decided for the first time that the "reason-
able doubt standard" was part of due process and applicable to the
states. Accordingly, the position taken by Justices Roberts and Pomeroy,
would not only shift the burden of proving sanity, but would also re-
quire the prosecution, as a matter of due process, to prove sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Justice Jones, in his separate opinion, did not agree that sanity
should be treated as an element of the crime. He defended the tradi-
tional concept of insanity as being an affirmative defense. His argument
is based on the definition of legal insanity as formulated under the
M'Naghten test.20 Under this rule, the test for legal insanity does not
focus on the question of the capacity to formulate the requisite intent,
but rather on the question of whether or not the defendant was capable
of distinguishing the quality of his act as between right and wrong.21
In other words, the test would be--did he know that the act he intended
to carry out was wrong? Mr. Justice Jones says: "Legal insanity in this
Commonwealth may or may not bear on the question of intent .... An
individual may intentionally kill someone with malice aforethought,
but be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in so doing." 22
Therefore, by virtue of the very nature of the M'Naghten test, intent
must be divorced from the concept of sanity. To hold, that intent and
sanity are so interrelated as to constitute a homogeneous element of the
crime, would be paramount to abandoning the basic operating premise
of the M'Naghten rule, hence abandoning the rule itself. Accordingly,
Justice Jones takes the view that insanity can not be, and should not be
considered, an element of the crime; but rather, must continue to be
considered a matter of defense.
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
20. The Queen v. M'Naghten, 10 CI.& F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This case es-
tablished the following rule: "it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commit-
ting of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten
test was adopted in this Commonwealth a few years later in Commonwealth v. Mosler,
4 Pa. 264, (1846). It has remained the test of insanity through a long succession of cases.
A more recent application of the rule may be found in Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,
401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98, (1960).21. Commonwealth v. Neil, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949). See also Commonwealth
v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952).
22. See note 6
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. SOME INCIDENTAL SPECULATION ON THE ROBERTS OPINION
As noted above, the heart of the argument by Justice Jones centers
around the distinction between sanity and intent inherent in the
M'Naghten rule. To this extent, the arguments espoused by Justice
Roberts, run contrary to the traditional concept of legal insanity as
defined under the M'Naghten rule.
It is submitted that Justice Roberts is in fact tacitly dissenting from
the M'Naghten rule and its rigid approach to the sanity issue. It is
further submitted that he would almost certainly favor a more compre-
hensive and reliable test of insanity.
Justice Roberts has been a staunch advocate of the concept of "dimin-
ished responsibility" as a means of softening the stringent interpreta-
tion accorded questions of mental capacity under the M'Naghten rule.
The concept of diminished responsibility involves a recognition that
the defendant may not be legally insane under the M'Naghten test, but
nevertheless be suffering from a mental disorder of sufficient magnitude
as to affect his capacity to form the premeditated intent requisite of
first degree murder. Diminished responsibility is analogous to the lack
of malice aforethought which distinguishes manslaughter from murder
of the first degree. Likewise, proof of diminished responsibility would
prevent conviction of murder in the first degree, and thereby avoid a
possible death sentence. California applies this approach under what is
known as the "Wells-Gorshen rule. '23 However, this concept has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 24 which
continues to rely on the all-or-nothing approach of the M'Naghten rule.
In those cases which have rejected the concept of diminished responsi-
bility, Justice Roberts has steadfastly dissented. Examining his dis-
senting opinions in Commonwealth v. Ahearn,25 Commonwealth v.
Phelan,26 and Commonwealth v. Rightnour,27 one readily detects his
genuine dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten test. In all three cases,
Justice Roberts argues for the admission of expert psychiatric testimony
to support and sustain the existence of diminished responsibility. In
Rightnour, he attacked the majority opinion of the court saying: "In
23. People v. Gorshen, 51 CaL2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959). See also People v. Wells 33
Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
24. The court rejected diminished responsibility by a four-three decision in Com-
monwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966).
25. Id.
26. Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A2d 540 (1967).
27. Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969).
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my view, the position advanced [by the majority] must be based, at
least in part, on the belief that a person is wholly sane or wholly insane,
a position which is now abandoned as based on a psychological un-
truth." 28
It is submitted that the approach taken by Justice Roberts in the
instant case, marks a progression beyond the argument for diminished
responsibility which he first espoused in the Ahearn decision. It appears
as though Justice Roberts has come to the conclusion that even if the
diminished responsibility concept were to be adopted in this common-
wealth, it would be insufficient to bring the M'Naghten test into focus
with twentieth century realities concerning mental disease and defect.
In future cases dealing with the insanity issue, it would not be sur-
prising to find Justice Roberts leading the assault against the antiquated
M'Naghten rule. It is further anticipated that he will indeed support a
more comprehensive test of insanity such as that proposed by the Model
Penal Code; 29 or possibly a modified form of the Durham rule,30 as it
has been applied in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.3 1
CONCLUSION
The instant case gives rise to a new and formidable principle of
criminal law in this commonwealth. The opinions of the majority in
this case have established that the presumption of sanity shall not be
the equivalent of full and express proof of sanity, but shall merely have
28. Id. at 122, 253 A.2d at 653.
29. THE MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4,01, (Final Draft 1962), provides that:
1. a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
2. the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise unsocial conduct.
30. The Durham rule does not involve the question of knowledge of right and wrong.
Instead, it specifically rejects the M'Naghten test on the grounds that it does not take
into account psychic realities and scientific knowledge, and is based upon one symptom
of insanity and so can not validly be applied in all circumstances. The Durham rule
is very simply stated as follows: an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the porduct of mental disease or mental defect. The key to this test lies in the
phrase "the product of," for it would not be sufficient merely to find that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect, it must also be shown that there exists a causal
connection between such mental abnormality and the act. See, Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (1954).
31. In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (1961), the following formula was
established: "the jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited
act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alledged to have violated."
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the effect of a procedural rule of law which eliminates the issue of sanity
from the criminal proceeding until raised by the defendant. To this
extent, Gerade and Iacobino have been overruled.
The present case also produces evidence of a significant trend which
has not yet attained the majority status of the court. Two of the Justices
of the court have expressed the opinion that insanity should no longer
be treated as a defense. Instead, sanity should be regarded as an element
of the crime, with the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, resting with the commonwealth.
And, finally, mention must be made of what can only be described as
a speculative trend regarding future opinions of Justice Roberts con-
cerning the appropriate test for insanity. It would appear, from his
opinion in the Vogel case, as well as his opinions in such related deci-
sions as Ahearn, that his future opinions will be in the vanguard of
those which attack the M'Naghten test as an antiquated relic of the
dark ages.
Ronald C. Mokowski
LABOR LAW-FEERAL COURTS-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947-SUITS UNDER § 301(a) TO ENJOIN STRIKES IN BREACH OF A No-
STRIKE AGREEMENT-The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that a federal court may enjoin a strike which violates the no-strike
provision of a collective bargaining agreement if that agreement con-
tains a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
In the Boys Market case, the Supreme Court of the United States once
again considered the effect of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1 on an
1. Section 4 provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute or prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of em-
ployment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
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